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Abstract 
The post-Cold War era is over. Demand for advanced future U.S. Naval capabilities continues to 
grow in the face of resurgent/rising military and technological competitors. The nation needs a 
more powerful Navy that incorporates new technologies and new operational concepts that 
combine manned and unmanned systems. The surface warship acquisition and sustainment 
process must evolve to address this challenge. It requires careful consideration of solutions—old 
and new—to efficiently insert the technology that achieves dominant warfighting effectiveness for 
these future warships over their entire service lives. 
The ability to rapidly transition advanced mature technology and confidently integrate evolving 
HM&E and Combat Systems into our ships to outpace the threat and assure naval superiority is 
an imperative. History is replete with examples of leading companies—and militaries—that failed 
to dominate due to miscalculations in the management of new technology and poor execution of 
operational processes. In the same way that Colonel John Boyd, USAF, developed and applied 
the concept of an OODA Loop (a decision cycle of observe, orient, decide, and act) to combat 
operations, a construct for a Navy Warship Acquisition OODA Loop can provide a model of 
individual and organizational learning and adaptation. 
Introduction 
Sun Tzu, the great Chinese general from the fourth century BCE, is credited as the 
author of The Art of War and founder of maneuver warfare. Maneuver warfare is defined by 
characteristics like swiftness of action, cycles of dispersion and concentration, deception, 
surprise, fluidity, shock and flexibility. The other defining feature of maneuver warfare was that it 
tried to avoid actual combat. When fighting was necessary, Sun Tzu emphasized maneuver 
warfare characterized by quickness, variety, surprise, and harmony (Giles, 1910). 
U.S. Air Force Colonel John Boyd was a military strategist of the late 20th century whom 
some considered the modern Sun Tzu (Coram, 2002). Boyd’s statement “He who can handle 
the quickest rate of change survives” was in reference to aerial dogfighting but applies equally 
to the Navy warship acquisition and sustainment challenge. His idea of “fast transients” 
suggests that in order to win or gain superiority, we should operate at a faster tempo than our 
adversaries, or inside our adversary’s time scale. 
The lesson for us still today, whether in operational warfighting or in the defense 
acquisition sphere supporting the warfighter, is that speed and agility can overcome raw power. 
Future battles are to be won through the disruption of the enemy’s decision cycle and ability to 
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react, through maneuver—in acquisition as well as at sea—and not only through the physical 
destruction of forces. In his whitepaper The Future Navy, previous CNO Richardson affirmed 
this and amplified the warning that the uni-polar post–Cold War world has changed, stating that 
time is of the essence (Richardson, 2017). 
The former CNO is not alone in his views, nor is the problem solely a Navy one. In 
testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Ellen M. Lord stated: 
Arguably, the weapon systems that the Department delivers to the 
warfighter today are the finest in the world. Inarguably, however, the current 
pace at which we develop advanced capability is being eclipsed by those 
nations that pose the greatest threat to our security, seriously eroding our 
measure of overmatch. Additionally, the increasing cost of our major 
weapon systems has placed at risk our ability to acquire and sustain these 
systems at the level required by our fighting forces. (Lord, 2017) 
Acting Secretary of the Navy Thomas Modly (Department of the Navy, 2018) and 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition (ASN[RD&A]) 
James F. Geurts (Abbott, 2018a, b, c; Geurts, 2018; Weisgerber, 2018; Werner, 2018) are 
focused on the same issues and are inspiring the Navy acquisition team to improve. But some 
are quite blunt in their assessment of our significant organizational challenge. According to 
Arnold Punaro, a retired Marine Corps general and former staff director of the SASC, our post–
Cold War acquisition process can be summed up in seven words: “spend more, take longer and 
get less” (Lubold, 2013). We must fight bureaucratic inertia and adopt fast-cycle behaviors, or 
we will be unable to keep up with the increasing pace of technological change, and our Navy will 
suffer. 
There are too many examples to count of leading companies—and militaries—that failed 
to dominate in the long term due to miscalculations in the management of new technology and 
poor execution of operational processes that implement it. Navy acquisition must accept the 
concept of disruptive innovation described by Harvard Business School’s Joseph Bower and 
Clayton Christensen (1995) and guard against the self-deception that can come with past 
success to avoid this fate. In short, our potential adversaries can implement and benefit from 
emerging technologies the same as us and are already doing so without many of our 
bureaucratic constraints. Our nation’s dominant position in military technology over the past 
several decades is no longer assured. 
The ever-increasing pace of change we face presents a daunting challenge to traditional 
surface ship acquisition as well as ship sustainment practices and processes. As clearly stated 
by former Secretary of the Navy Dr. Richard Danzig (2011), we must question our methods, 
starting with those that suppose we can develop clear, unchanging operational requirements 
today for a complex surface warship over the next 40+ years. When it takes more than 10 years 
to conceive of, design, and construct a warship, and then it may operate at sea for more than 30 
years, it is simply unrealistic to expect that the current requirements process will produce a 
warship that will be combat effective for that long. This once might have worked, when cycle-
times for defense technology were measured in decades, but those timelines have compressed 
drastically and can now be measured in years for hardware, and in months for software. But 
today it can yield a lead ship for a new class that is no longer effective in the prevailing 
environment. Since (especially today and going forward) there is no way of knowing if the future, 
or set of futures, being planned for is the right one, we must design and build our surface 
warships, manage technology development and insertion, and integrate these systems, 
differently. Warships must be able to respond more easily to a future of uncertainty. 
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Our challenge today is formidable. The system that won the Cold War, but since the 
McNamara era has added ever more prescriptive acquisition management policies, may be 
structurally unable to keep up with the increasing pace of technological advancement. We need 
a much more responsive approach. But this change should come from within, not simply be a 
response to a Congressionally driven acquisition reform initiative, or (heaven forbid) the result of 
a spectacular U.S. Naval defeat. In fact, the Navy acquisition community has selectively shown 
this can be done with the tools, people, and processes that already exist. We need to combine 
the right “parts” and execute widely. 
Key Challenges for Warship Acquisition 
The Navy ship acquisition community faces a call to action from many quarters. Driving 
issues to be addressed include the following: 
• Demand for Increased Force Structure 
• Pace of Technology 
• Better Ship Design for Lifecycle Sustainment 
Demand for Increased Force Structure 
A 350-ship Navy became a plank in the 2016 Trump campaign platform in response to 
changes in the post-Cold War world, and the “near peer” competition threats to the United 
States. In December 2016, the Navy released a new Force Structure Assessment calling for 
355 ships (U. S. Navy, 2016). This recommendation is an increase of 47 in the minimum 
number of ships from the previous requirement of 308. Within a year, Congress prescribed that 
“it shall be the policy of the United States to have available, as soon as practicable, not fewer 
than 355 battle force ships, comprised of the optimal mix of platforms” (Current State of Defense 
Acquisition, 2017). 
Actualizing the funding and fielding the human and industrial resources to meet this 
demand is a challenge given the many fiscal priorities of our nation. The Navy currently has 296 
deployable Battle Force Ships (NAVSHIPSO, 2020). Given the U.S. shipbuilding average of 
delivering 5.4 large naval ships and submarines per year since the post–Cold War drawdown of 
the mid-1990’s (The Heritage Foundation, 2019), along with the anticipated ship 
decommissionings, it will take time to realize the new goal. In addition, the industrial base, 
including shipyards, combat systems developers and their respective supply chains, have 
adjusted their capacities for the prevailing orders over the past 25 years. The human and 
industrial capacity investments to execute this work will also take time. Meeting the demand for 
more new warships will be an “across the board” effort that evokes past mobilization eras and 
the attendant challenges, well described by Doerry and Koenig (2018) and Koenig and Doerry 
(2019). 
While acquiring more ships must clearly be a part of the solution, the size of our fleet is 
determined by many factors, not the least of which is whether the ships we do build stay in 
service as long as we expect. Implications for future naval force structure planning and the 
relationship with ship service life has been well described by members of the Future Ship and 
Force Architecture Concepts Division in the Naval Sea Systems Command (Koenig, Nalchajian, 
& Hootman, 2009). The Navy has also taken steps to extend the service life of current DDG-51 
class ships (Eckstein, 2018) and has examined options for other ship types (Eckstein, 2018). 
But this cannot be done by fiat. Extending service life requires a significant investment in 
maintenance and modernization to be effective. 
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Pace of Technology 
A major disruptive force in our society is the acceleration in the scope, scale, and 
economic impact of technology. The accelerating growth in technological change is an 
increasing dynamic in our society and in our military, as shown in Figure 1 (Westerheide, 2015). 
 
Figure 1. Accelerating Growth in Technology 
As important as the growth of technology overall is the rate at which it proliferates and 
the time it takes to be adopted. These have also been steadily trending to become faster, as 
documented by well-known venture capitalist Mary Meeker (2018), and experts believe that 
technological innovation is poised to continue to evolve and grow, likely at a speed beyond our 
ability to anticipate based on our past experience, due to rising and cheaper computing power 
and storage capacity, and rising and cheaper connectivity and data sharing. But these 
improvements may not be the whole story. Their impact is amplified by the associated data 
revolution that places unprecedented amounts of information in the hands of users and 
businesses (and militaries). These combined disruptive technological forces will bring significant 
impacts to nearly every sector, with many dual-use technologies having important military 
acquisition and operational impact. 
CNO Richardson clearly described the broad scope of this increasing rate of 
technological creation and adoption in A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority 
(Richardson, 2016). He called for increased interaction with industry, academia, and non-
traditional partners in research and acquisition. In The Future Navy (2017), he further directed: 
“The Navy must get to work now to both build more ships, and to think forward—innovate—as 
we go. To remain competitive, we must start today and we must improve faster.” 
The Department of the Navy’s Naval Research Enterprise (NRE) has recognized that to 
win, the Navy must be first to field decisive capabilities. The NRE promulgated its strategy (U. S. 
Navy, 2017) to address the gaps, affirming the need to accelerate processes, stating: “Maritime 
superiority requires outpacing adversaries. The RDT&E status quo is inadequate to keep pace 
with technology innovation.” The surface warship acquisition community that leverages the 
products of the NRE must look at its processes to align with Navy Research and Development 
(R&D) as well as academic research and industry Independent Research and Development 
(IRAD) sources to insert mature technology into our fleet at a rate that assures military 
preeminence. 
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Better Ship Design for Lifecycle Sustainment 
Traditional surface warship design has typically focused almost solely on the initial 
configuration of the combat system suite and its supporting systems developed using a “single 
step” acquisition model. After a development process of over 12 to 15 years, the lead ship 
enters service and operates for several years until its capability atrophies and a “mid-life” 
upgrade is required. This timeline, depicted in Figure 2, represents an average of development 
times for major weapons systems and surface combatants over the past several decades 
(Simmons, 1975). 
 
Figure 2. Traditional Surface Combatant Lifecycle Model 
The traditional ship acquisition model requires payloads and platforms be developed in 
series. To minimize ship construction program risk, a combat system element or other 
supporting ship system “payload” is required to be fully mature. This approach permits highly 
accurate and well-defined parameters to be incorporated into the platform requirements 
documents. Though there is a benefit from tight programmatic control, there is an inherent cost 
to the Navy warfighter, however. As time passes, the military worth of a combat system payload 
declines, primarily due to the change in the adversary threat, but also due to technology 
obsolescence. As a result, the traditional series development of payload and platform severely 
limits the useful life of a combat system that is designed for an adversary whose capabilities are 
robust and continually evolving. Follow-on ships of a “flight” or “baseline” will have an even 
shorter effective life before modernization is required, and a large, Multi-Year Procurement may 
well result in the delivery of later ships with limited effectiveness against near peer competitors. 
These ships have traditionally had a “closed” physical architecture, which has limited the 
change to the more dynamic elements of naval warships, as depicted by the blue shapes in 
Figure 3.1 This is a heritage from an era when technology was advancing more slowly than it 
does now and was sustained during the post-Cold War era when the threat from a near peer 
competitor was not a driving issue. 
 
1 With acknowledgement to the inspiration for this depiction of “Surface Combatant stable vs dynamic design elements” owed to 
Dr. Norbert Doerry who created a similar list for one of the draft slides supporting the ASNE Day 2013 panel “Modularity: 
Benefits of Modular Adaptable Ships” moderated by (then) PEO Ships, RDML David H. Lewis, USN. 
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Figure 3. Traditional "closed" ship architecture 
In addition, these ships have often reached the point with a need for upgrades that the 
cost vs. performance trade-offs led to a decision to decommission the ship before it reached its 
estimated service life, rather than spend large sums of funding to conduct extensive complex 
overhauls on these warships over long durations. As discussed by Koenig et al. (2009), a key 
element influencing realized service life of U.S. Navy warships has been technical obsolescence 
and the difficulty to modernize them cost effectively. In Table 1 of their paper, the authors 
provide a comprehensive look at the realized service lives of all the surface combatant classes 
that have been fully retired since WWII, as well as some that remain in service. In an update to 
this table, Dr. Koenig briefed the Navy’s Flexible Ships Integrated Product Team (IPT) (Koenig, 
2018) on results through mid-April 2018. This data showed that for Large Surface Combatants 
(Cruisers and Destroyers) with an estimated service life of 35 years, and Small Surface 
Combatants (Frigates) with an estimated service life of 30 years, none had achieved these 
goals to date.2 The average service life of all 256 of these surface combatants calculated from 
this data is less than 24 years—far below the expectation that the Navy had for the investments 
in these warships. 
Previous CNOs ADM Jonathan W. Greenert and ADM Richardson promulgated direction 
that challenges the acquisition community to change the way those previous warships were 
designed, shipbuilding programs were executed and ships were sustained. Improved ship 
design is required to keep the ships relevant in service and deliver longer effective life. 
In his article “Payloads over Platforms: Charting a New Course,” CNO Greenert made 
the case for a different kind of ship, a “dependable truck” (Greenert, 2012), stating: 
To ensure our Navy stays relevant, these platforms have to adapt to the 
changing fiscal, security, and technological conditions they will encounter 
over their long service lives. It is unaffordable, however, to adapt a 
platform by replacing either it or its integral systems each time a new 
mission or need arises. We will instead need to change the modular 
weapon, sensor, and unmanned vehicle “payloads” a platform carries or 
employs. 
In a major step to enable this vision, CNO Greenert signed out two memoranda on 
mandatory SWaP-C3 margin requirements, invoking key cost, schedule, and performance 
parameters. As stated in the August 11, 2014 directive (Greenert, 2014):  
 
2 Some individual ships came very close to the service life goal, but class averages did not. It remains to be seen how the 
remaining Ticonderoga-class cruisers and the in-service Arleigh Burke–Class destroyers will meet current service life extension 
goals. 
3 SWaP-C: Space, Weight, Power and Cooling. 
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Establishment of SWaP-C requirements will help ensure new platforms 
begin with sufficient–and clearly defined–design margin. This will ensure 
platforms will accommodate new payloads or other systems needed to 
remain relevant as new threats and opportunities emerge over the 
platform’s life. 
CNO Richardson amplified this approach in The Future Navy (2017). These excerpts 
from that document provide specific ideas: 
The pace of change also demands that we design ships with 
modernization in mind. The “core” of those future ships—the hull, and the 
propulsion and power plants—will likely be built to last for decades. To 
leave room for future modernization, we should buy as much power 
capacity as we can afford. On top of that hull and power plant, we must 
plan from the outset to modernize the “punch”—the combat systems, 
sensors, and payloads—at the speed that technological advances allow. 
Future ships should be made for rapid improvement with modular 
weapons canisters and rapidly swappable electronic sensors and 
systems. Related, future designs must aggressively go after ways to drive 
down the costs to operate and maintain the future fleet, no matter its 
composition. 
… If we build with faster improvement cycles, the inherent cost of our 
systems and platforms can come down. 
Designing in the ability to modernize—plug and play hardware matched 
with software-programmability—will make upgrades quicker and more 
affordable even as we stay more capable. 
We must resolve the inherent tensions between conventional acquisition processes that 
drive us toward very dense ship designs with closed physical architectures that are incredibly 
difficult and expensive to modernize, and the need to implement innovative advanced 
technologies in order to sustain the current fleet with affordable combat relevance over the full 
ship life cycle as well as increase the overall size of the fleet by enabling ships to reach their 
estimated service lives. 
Key Enablers for Change 
Seven enablers must be applied to address these imperatives by building upon 
demonstrated capabilities within NAVSEA and its six affiliated PEOs as well as industry partners 
having shipbuilding, combat system and ship systems acquisition responsibilities. They are 
• More Agile Ship Acquisition Strategies 
• Responsive Coordination of Requirements, Resourcing, and Technology Selection 
• Flexible-Adaptable-Modular Open Systems Warship Design 
• Digital Engineering 
• Direct Fleet Operator Engagement 
• Experimentation 
• Innovative Contracting 
More Agile Ship Acquisition Strategies 
The U.S. Navy surface ship acquisition community could learn much from a careful 
examination of the Japanese auto maker Toyota’s fast-cycle strategies to compete and win 
against the U.S. auto industry, especially in the 1980s and 1990s. Insightful analysis is provided 
by Cusumano of MIT’s Sloan School of Management (1988), Bower & Hout in “Fast-Cycle 
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Capability for Competitive Power” (1988), and the book The Toyota Way: 14 Management 
Principles from the World’s Greatest Manufacturer by Liker (2004) among others. In Bower and 
Hout’s Harvard Business Review article, they illuminate the agility and the focus on process 
time at Toyota, as shown below in Figures 4 and 5 from their text. Note the cycle-time 
comparison between Toyota and Detroit in the second figure. This is the kind of advantage the 
U.S. Navy surface acquisition community must seek in order to maintain naval superiority over 
near peer competitors. 
 
Figure 4. Toyota performs critical operations faster... 
 
Figure 5. ...so it cuts time at every turn. 
In the manufacturing industry, Toyota is well known for their Lean Six Sigma (L6σ) 
implementation, known as the Toyota Production System. Toyota designed automobiles faster, 
with more reliability—yet at competitive cost—even when paying the relatively high wages of 
Japanese workers. As impressive was that every time Toyota showed an apparent weakness 
and seemed vulnerable to the competition, they fixed the problem and came back even 
stronger. A careful reading of the challenges that Toyota very effectively addressed to become 
the world’s best auto manufacturer will sound quite familiar to those that our U.S. Navy ship 
acquisition community faces. The Navy acquisition community must reenergize its commitment 
to L6σ and more proactively pursue fast-cycle strategies in its standard processes. 
Appropriately employing solutions like Toyota did in auto manufacturing (guiding principles, 
strategies, and processes) to the ship design, construction, and sustainment domain can 
provide a model for development and production excellence. 
In order to “tilt the table” in our favor to achieve greater agility, we propose employing 
Evolutionary Acquisition (EA) and the new acquisition authorities provided by Congress to 
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decouple the development of the payload from the development of the platform along the lines 
of CNO Greenert’s Payloads over Platforms thinking and adopt a Flexible - Adaptable – Modular 
Open Systems Warship Design as described in the next section of this paper. This decoupling 
will yield major benefits, as well as several ancillary ones. The key benefits include the 
following: 
• By designing the combatant subsystems (payload) in parallel with the ship platform, 
rather than in series with it, a new ship can put to sea with payloads that are five to 
seven years newer than would be the case under the current approach. 
• By permitting the relatively rapid swap-out of equipment and integration of new 
capabilities into a new weapon (or any other) system—at the speed of relevance—it is 
possible to modernize ships with less time and cost penalties than the current approach. 
This helps ensure combat relevance over the full ship life cycle. 
EA is a DoD procurement approach where capability is developed and delivered in 
increments as shown in Figure 6, where the acquisition program recognizes up front the need 
for future capability improvements. The objective is to balance needs and available capability 
with resources, to achieve more rapid acquisition of mature technology that supports earlier 
fielding of usable warfighting capability, coupled with technological upgrades in successive 
blocks to achieve full capability over time (“Evolutionary Acquisition,” 2018). EA essentially 
divides large systems into smaller chunks, increasing delivery flexibility and decreasing 
scheduling risk. Each block upgrade is managed as a separate increment for a fully operational 
system. Each increment will have its own set of requirements, funding, review cycles, 
certification and accreditation, milestones and Acquisition Strategy, in sequence, as shown in 
Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. Evolutionary Acquisition Strategy 
While this makes for a more complex program to manage, and imposes other potential 
risks (Dillard, 2010; Dillard & Ford, 2007), incremental development provides great benefit by 
allowing future capabilities to be added to a system as upgrades through either improved 
technology or other advantageous operational capabilities to meet a desired state. This is a 
necessary strategy to give the Navy a responsive framework to address the competition of near 
peer competitors. 
The fielding of these upgrades can be more rapidly done using recent acquisition 
authorities. The 2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) Section 804 provided 
guidance on a Middle Tier of Acquisition (MTA) for Rapid Prototyping and Rapid Fielding. 
Notably, these MTA approaches are not subject to the Joint Capabilities Integration and 
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Development System (JCIDS) Manual and Department of Defense Directive 5000.01, “The 
Defense Acquisition System.” Formal guidance for the processes governing MTA was released 
in Operation of the Middle Tier of Acquisition (DoD Instruction 5000.80) from the Defense 
Department on December 30, 2019 (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Aquisition and 
Sustainment, 2019). It identifies MTA as a pathway  
intended to fill a gap in the DAS4 for those capabilities that have a level of maturity to 
allow them to be rapidly prototyped within an acquisition program or fielded, within 5 
years of middle-tier acquisition program start. The MTA pathway may be used to 
accelerate capability maturation before transitioning to another acquisition pathway or 
may be used to minimally develop a capability before rapidly fielding.  
As depicted in the Figure 7 graphic below (LaCamera, Jr., 2019), which is simplified 
compared to the DODI 5000.80 Figure 1, this expands the opportunities to be more agile with 
the insertion of innovative and proven technologies. The MTA avenue can be used 
synergistically with the incremental development approach in EA for shipbuilding programs, as 
well as to field improvements in the current fleet. 
 
Figure 7. Potential Rapid Pathways 
Building upon the previous year’s Congressional acquisition reforms, the FY 2017 NDAA 
Acquisition Agility Act clearly communicated the aim to get better technology into the hands of 
the warfighter faster. Significant aspects championed by the House Armed Services Committee 
Chairman, Congressman “Mac” Thornberry (Gould, 2016), were implemented into law. This 
legislation (House Armed Services Committee, 2016) included provisions to: 
• Field better technology faster, encouraging only mature technology to go into 
procurement, while also promoting faster upgrades of key components. 
• Require all defense systems to be designed with modular open architectures to facilitate 
easy upgrades as technology and threats evolve and to allow for more competition for 
those upgrades. 
• Authorize each of the Services to utilize funding that is not tied to a specific Program of 
Record in order to prototype upgrades of components and to develop technology faster 
and more efficiently. 
• Promote experimentation and prototyping, not only to field capability, but to learn and 
develop new operational concepts. 
 
4 DAS: Defense Acquisition System 
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The Navy ship acquisition team needs to fully embrace these authorities from Congress 
and direction from Secretary Geurts in his subsequent Middle Tier Acquisition and Acquisition 
Agility Guidance memos (Geurts, 2018, 2019), and aggressively work toward making it the norm 
for doing business. 
Responsive Coordination of Requirements, Resourcing, and Technology Selection 
In order to support an agile acquisition process, the supporting aspects of requirements 
definition, financial resourcing and decisions on what technology to pursue must be made more 
responsive. This requires a tighter coupling of the efforts, on an appropriate drumbeat, between 
the Surface Warfare Directorate (OPNAV 96) staff, the Ship Acquisition Program Manager 
(SHAPM) and Technology Managers in the NRE as well as within the SYCOMS, PEOs and 
programs. 
In OPNAV N96, the Surface Warfare Tactical Requirement Group (SWTRG) offers a 
model to consider. It was formally established in July 2012 (Deputy Chief of Naval Operations 
for Warfare Systems (OPNAV N9), 2012) to provide guidance, governance, and definition for 
Surface Navy Combat System incremental modernization to be provided through the Advanced 
Capability Build (ACB) process. It aims to provide coordination and collaboration across 
resource sponsors, program offices, and the fleet to provide integrated surface warfare 
capability requirements to the acquisition community. The SWTRG is the decision-making body 
for aligning existing Programs of Record (PORs), new technologies, and new requirements to a 
given ACB. The SWTRG is positioned to provide the coordination needed for a future surface 
warship design and incremental modernization Tactical Requirements Group (TRG), and 
consideration could be given to expanding its scope. 
Technology selection requires a group of ship acquisition professionals and 
technologists organized as a Technology Insertion Group (TIG) that will provide disciplined and 
focused governance of the process by which technology is screened, evaluated and selected for 
insertion. The TIG will need to synchronize with the N96 TRG, the SHAPM, NAVSEA Director 
for Surface Ship Maintenance and Modernization (SEA 21) Program Manager and DASN 
RDT&E staff in its execution. The Navy undersea warfare community’s Technology Insertion 
(TI) process for hardware and Advanced Processing Build (APB) process for software offer 
examples to examine and adapt for the surface warship domain. 
Flexible - Adaptable - Modular Open Systems Warship Design 
Executing an EA strategy combined with Middle Tier of Acquisition pathways for the 
design, construction and modernization of Navy warships requires future ships to have inherent 
flexibility in mission reconfiguration, allowing them to be capable of accommodating new 
technologies over the entire service life of the ship and keeping pace with the shorter life cycles 
of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) products. The implications of this were discussed in the 
2003 SNAME paper by Abbott, Devries, Schoenster and Vasilakos (2003). 
Development of modularity solutions and codification of standard payload-to-platform 
interfaces offer ship designers and systems engineers the opportunity to redefine the distinction 
between the payload and the platform. Modularity in some forms, such as the Mk 41 Vertical 
Launching System (VLS), has been successfully implemented in U.S. Navy surface combatants 
since the design and construction of USS Bunker Hill (CG 52), the first Baseline 2 AEGIS 
cruiser, and a similar approach continued in the Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) destroyers. The Littoral 
Combat Ship (LCS) and accompanying LCS Mission Modules fielded a very different solution. 
The DDG-1000 program developed yet another. For the future, it is proposed that any 
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modularity should be targeted toward facilitating regular periodic upgrades, rather than tactical 
flexibility5 that was the original vision for LCS.  
The Surface Navy’s vision of delivering warships with increased flexibility and modularity 
to achieve more affordable relevance over the life cycle has led to a growing initiative. 
Beginning in the spring of 2013, OPNAV N96 conducted a 90 Day Flexible Ships Assessment, 
followed by a rapid Ship Concepts Study. PEO Ships subsequently kicked off a Flexible Ships 
Roadmap development effort in the fall of 2013, and a Navy Flexible Ships IPT was established 
to build upon this work. This IPT was formally chartered on September 30, 2017, to provide a 
governance structure for a multidisciplinary group across stakeholder organizations to address 
and resolve cross-program policy, technical, and programmatic issues as well provide advocacy 
for the implementation of flexible solutions in surface ships. That group has determined a set of 
features and described anticipated benefits of a Flexible Ship design (Sturtevant, 2017): 
Features 
 ● Payloads de-coupled from 
platforms 
 ● Standard interfaces 
 ● Rapid re-configuration 
 ● Planned access routes 
 ● Growth margins for modernization 
Benefits 
 ● Separates payload development from platform production 
 ● Affordable alternate business model to lengthy and costly ship production 
work 
 ● Increased competition and innovation 
 ● Cross-platform commonality 
 ● Rapid prototyping of payloads enables rapid acquisition of new 
capabilities 
 ● Modular open systems enable Acquisition Agility 
 ● Efficient technology refresh and incremental upgrades 
 ● Outpaces the threat 
Akin to the great strides made in surface combat systems with AEGIS Open Architecture (OA) 
(DeLuca et al., 2013) on software OA, shipbuilding must develop a physical OA like that 
articulated by the Flexible Ships IPT to enact the open architecture vision described by 
Secretary Geurts (Abbott, 2018) and permit future technology refresh and incremental capability 
upgrades at the speed of relevance, as depicted in Figure 8.  
 
5 The LCS has an unclassified operational requirement to pull into a suitable port and change out a complete warfighting Mission 
Package in 96 hours. This supports converting the role of this “focused mission” ship between Mine Countermeasure (MCM), 
Surface Warfare (SUW) and Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW). The requirement was a design driver for the modularity solution, 
directly influencing Seaframe and Mission Module design. 
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In order to keep pace with the technological changes and outpace adversary threats, 
and in view of our inability to perfectly predict the future, warships must be Designed for Change 
(DfC). This is imperative to enable more rapid construction and modernization, delivering more 
effective warships with increased operational availability (Ao) and address the demand for 
increased force structure with more dominant warships, changing the age-old calculus and 
delivering the benefits depicted in Figure 9 (Drewry & Jons, 1975; Simmons, 1975; Systems 
Consultants, 1974). 
 
Figure 9. Flexible Ship Payoff 
A DfC strategy that addresses attributes such as Adaptability, Agility, Changeability, 
Flexibility, Modifiability, Robustness and Scalability (Fricke & Schulz, 2005; Ross, Rhodes, & 
Hastings, 2008) will support continuous evolution and achieve affordable combat relevance over 
the full ship life cycle. 
Looking at the payoff of this strategy at a Navy “enterprise” level, rather than only the 
ship acquisition community’s point of view, a Flexible Ship design employing an EA strategy 
delivers tangible operational benefit to the warfighter. By enabling more rapid upgrade cycles 
more often, a Flexible Ship provides the acquisition community a way to deliver more consistent 
military value to the warfighter over the entire service life of the warship. This is shown in Figure 
Figure 8. Upgradeable Flexible Surface Combatant 
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10, adapted from work (Systems Consultants Inc., 1974) done during the SEAMOD6 R&D 
program, an early Navy study to examine a modular ship concept. 
 
Figure 10. Military Effectiveness Comparison Between Traditional and Flexible Ship Designs 
Once only an idea of visionary ship designers (Abbott, 1977; Abbott & Garver, 2014; 
Doerry, 2012), the Flexible – Adaptable – Modular Open Systems Warship Design approach 
has increasingly gained wider acceptance (Griffin, 2015; Khalifa, 2017; Shank et al., 2015). This 
approach is the accepted design architecture for the Large Surface Combatant, part of the 
broader Future Surface Combatant Force. The previous Director, Surface Warfare (OPNAV 
N96) RADM Ronald Boxall stated: “Flexibility and adaptability, the ability to upgrade quickly, is 
going to be a key requirement” (Larter, 2018). 
Digital Engineering 
Digitalization is the use of digital technologies to change a business model and provide 
new revenue and value-producing opportunities; it is the process of moving to a digital business 
(Gartner, Inc., 2018). Digitalization has become a key enabler for making commercial industry 
more innovative, efficient and positioned for future operations. Major firms in the automotive, 
health care, and aerospace sectors have made significant investments in developing a digital 
business model and are transforming the way that their work is done. 
In June 2018, the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering 
(USD[R&E]) Dr. Michael Griffin released the DoD Digital Engineering Strategy (DoD, 2018). 
This strategy promotes the use of digital representations of systems and components and the 
use of digital artifacts to design and sustain defense systems. Among the DoD’s strategic goals 
is the aim to adopt and support digital engineering across the life cycle. 
In the maritime domain, a handful of international shipyards appear to be leading the 
way with digital implementation and a few shipbuilders in the United States are not far behind. 
Huntington Ingalls–Newport News Shipbuilding and Electric Boat have made real progress on 
the “Digital Shipbuilding” path, supported by the National Shipbuilding Research Program over 
the period from December 2014 to September 2017 (NSRP, 2018). Significant work has been 
 
6 SEAMOD: SEA Systems MODification and MODernization by MODularity and InterMODality 
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accomplished in implementing a Digital Twin7 of the Nuclear Aircraft Carrier and Nuclear 
Submarine product lines, and by employing a Digital Thread8 (Debbink, 2017). 
Benefits expected from having a Digital Twin for each product unit include  
• More effective assessment of a system’s current and future capabilities during its life 
cycle 
• Early discovery of system performance deficiencies by simulating results before physical 
processes and product are developed 
• Optimization of operability, manufacturability, inspectability, and sustainability leveraging 
models and simulations applied during the entire life cycle of each tail number9 
• Continuous refinement of designs and models through data captured and easily cross 
referenced to design details (Leiva, 2016). 
The commercial marine sector has seen that the use of digital models and in-situ data 
collection enables more rapid identification and response to issues in service (Borgschulte, 
2017). Use of affordable sensors and increased connectivity, along with the availability of 
increasing data storage and computational power are enablers for new ways of managing a 
ship’s safety and performance in operation. Digital models and analysis tools also enable more 
efficient future upgrade planning and responsive technology insertion. 
The Navy ship acquisition community needs to execute a digitalization implementation 
strategy and solidify the government’s side of the equation along with the operational fleet 
maintenance staffs to create synergy with industry and deliver the powerful results that are 
possible. Naval shipbuilding engages many suppliers and stakeholders and depends on efficient 
communication among them throughout the life cycle of each ship. The Digital Twin and Digital 
Thread can be effective tools to facilitate this valuable collaboration and evaluate new 
capabilities. The promising pilot program “virtual twin” of the AEGIS Combat System being 
developed by PEO IWS is a significant step in this direction and could present a model for the 
ship design and shipbuilding community (Eckstein, 2017; Freedberg, 2018). 
Direct Fleet Operator Engagement & Input 
Strong involvement from a cross section of the fleet–and not just officers–can provide 
the direct user input that allows the acquisition community to address specific capabilities and 
fleet needs. Since 2011, submarine community participation in the development process has 
grown with more junior officers and sailors added to the mix through the Tactical Advancements 
for the Next Generation (TANG) design thinking forums (DON Innovation, 2017; Hall, 2012; 
Johnston & Featherstone, 2014; Nobles, 2014; Smith, 2013; TANG, 2018). As described by 
TANG Director Josh Smith, then-VADM John Richardson (while Commander, Submarine 
Forces) and then-RADM James Caldwell (while Commander of Submarine Force U.S. Pacific 
Fleet) asked squadron commodores to “nominate two switched-on JO/ST/FT (three-man) teams 
from each squadron to participate. Ideally, your nominees should be motivated, energetic, 
creative Sailors with recent deployment or patrol experience.” This warfighter-centered 
innovation approach has revolutionized the submarine advanced technology development 
community and made a real, positive impact, especially for human-centered design, for the 
submarine operational and acquisition communities. As shown in Figure 11, their success has 
 
7 A Digital Twin ship is a digital copy of a real ship, including its systems, that combines the information available about the ship 
in a digital realm. 
8 The Digital Thread refers to the communication framework that allows a connected data flow and integrated view of the asset’s 
data throughout its lifecycle across traditionally siloed functional perspectives. The Digital Thread concept raises the bar for 
delivering “the right information to the right place at the right time.” (Leiva, 2016) 
9 Or in the context of this paper, each warship. 
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led to a wider variety of TANG forums being conducted beyond Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) 
(Adams, 2017), and have involved some groups from the Surface Force. 
 
Figure 11. Growth of the TANG forums initiative 
Since 2013, a second forum, The Athena Project, has been established (The Athena 
Project, 2018a, b). This initiative was founded in the Surface Community, beginning aboard 
USS Benfold (DDG 65) in 2013 (Cannon, 2014). It is focused on harnessing deckplate 
innovations to create a cadre of forward-thinking, creatively confident sailors for the fleet of 
tomorrow. The Athena Project creates a formal process for sailors to pitch innovative ideas to 
improve their command or the Navy in an open forum to fellow sailors as well as leaders in 
industry, academia, and government. 
The rise of both TANG and The Athena Project show that the fleet is ready and willing to 
put the energy into innovation. The time is right for the surface ship acquisition community to 
engage them. 
Experimentation 
Military experimentation is a military activity conducted to discover, test, demonstrate, or 
explore future military concepts, organizations, and equipment and the interplay among them, 
using a combination of actual, simulated, and surrogate forces and equipment (National 
Research Council, 2004). Experimentation can examine technology, doctrine, and 
organizational concepts. As described by Kass, warfighting experiments are vital from the 
beginnings of the acquisition process through fielding of a capability and can be grouped into 
one of four general methods: analytic wargame, constructive, human-in-the-loop, and field 
experiments (Kass, 2008). A significant advantage of the first three methods is an ability to use 
simulation to examine capabilities that do not yet exist. Once a prototype exists, however, the 
ability to experiment with it under operational conditions provides critical feedback on its 
warfighting relevance. Because the operational environment cannot be controlled in field 
experiments like it can in the other three methods, and at-sea operations have increased cost 
and complexity, a consistent, systematized approach to experimentation under operational 
conditions is critical to obtaining valid results and better understanding the military impact. The 
Navy’s undersea acquisition community has worked closely with a Submarine Development 
Squadron to help provide this structure. Over the past several decades, the Surface Navy has 
not had a unique organization like this (Boulay, 2019) and has had to coordinate 
experimentation activities with ships of opportunity. But that changed in 2019 with the creation 
of Surface Development Squadron ONE (SURFDEVRON ONE). 
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SURFDEVRON ONE was established on May 22, 2019, to rapidly accelerate 
experimentation, with its primary functions to 
• Execute experimentation to support development of new and emerging surface 
warfighting capabilities. 
• Develop material and technical solutions to tactical challenges. 
• Coordinate doctrine, organization, training, material, logistics, personnel and facilities 
requirements for unmanned surface systems (Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. 
Pacific Fleet Public Affairs, 2019). 
SURDEVRON’s Commodore Henry Adams has described one of his lines of effort as 
DevOps,10 with the intent to inform Surface Warfare requirements by “getting to the left of the 
acquisition/requirements process” and employing “aggressive experimentation to inform what 
we want.” He has described two focus areas: establishing a capability to “broker” between the 
development community and fleet; and figuring out how to get installs done faster” (Adams, 
2019). This organization provides a critical capability for experimentation with emerging 
technology and providing a path to insert that technology in a structured, consistent manner. 
In addition, linking the recently created Surface Development Squadron experimentation 
venue as a proofing environment with Surface Warship TANG and Athena Project innovators 
would be invaluable to effect direct fleet operator engagement in the surface warship acquisition 
and sustainment process. Leveraging the excellent work and expansion of the TANG and 
Athena Project forums, the surface ship acquisition community should work with the 
SURFDEVRON to develop this model and establish a Surface Warship Design TANG to 
engage creative sailors and boost human-centered design in our surface fleet. In parallel, an 
Athena Project on Surface Warship Design should be considered to capture deckplate 
innovations and get them into the technology development pipeline to mature them for future 
implementation. These combined inputs could be a potent influence on future surface 
combatant designs. 
Innovative Contracting 
Like the previously discussed acquisition authorities, the Navy shipbuilding community 
should expand the use of Other Transaction Authorities (OTAs) to facilitate more responsive 
technology upgrade insertion and keep our warships combat-relevant in service. OTAs are 
legally binding contracts that can be used to carry out research projects that meet the 
stipulations set forth in two sections of 2016 NDAA Section 815. They enable programs to gain 
access to innovative research and development from non-traditional contractors who are 
challenged by the standard requirements of a traditional Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)-
based procurement contract. Secretary Geurts has encouraged the use of OTAs, citing their 
benefit in rapidly awarding prototyping contracts for technology supporting naval exercises 
(Abbott, 2018) and has given System Commands OTA authority up to $100 million (Maucione, 
2018). 
The Navy Surface Technology and Innovation Consortium (NSTIC) OTA presents a 
unique opportunity “supporting naval surface technology innovation to provide research, 
development, test and evaluation, analysis, integration and certification of complex naval 
warfare systems across a broad range of systems-related areas and disciplines” (Naval Surface 
Technology & Innovation Consortium [NSTIC], 2020). This OTA enables ship acquisition and 
 
10 DevOps is a set of practices most commonly used in software development and Information Technology operations. A 
definition is: “the combination of cultural philosophies, practices, and tools that increases an organization’s ability to deliver 
applications and services at high velocity: evolving and improving products at a faster pace than organizations using traditional 
software development and infrastructure management processes. This speed enables organizations to better serve their customers 
and compete more effectively in the market” (Amazon Web Services, Inc., 2020). 
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sustainment organizations to pursue innovative prototype projects in 21 technology areas that 
involve advanced concept demonstrations, risk reduction prototyping, technology 
demonstrations, and development of pre-production prototypes. This OTA venue can support 
experimentation and become a valuable element of the rapid technology insertion strategy. 
In summary, the Navy surface ship acquisition community could improve its ability to 
respond to the demanding challenges it faces by considering the seven strategies outlined. 
Combining these “fundamentals” with a specific “playbook” for Technology Insertion using an 
OODA Loop Strategy (and what that is) will be discussed in the remainder of this paper. 
John Boyd & The OODA Loop 
Col John Boyd is described by some as the greatest military strategist in history no one 
knows about. And while some deify him—and others loathe him—his example as a person who 
“bucked the system” to make a lasting difference is compelling (Coram, 2002; Thompson, 
2008). Perhaps his most significant contributions to military strategy came from a series of 
briefings he gave in various forums. In the 1970s and 1980s, Boyd started to see that the 
insights he’d developed in his Energy-Maneuverability Theory, how surprise, variety, quickness 
and harmony led to dominance in air-to-air combat, had far reaching implications. One of his 
key ideas is a powerful concept: the OODA Loop—Observe, Orient, Decide, Act. It has 
subsequently been applied by conventional militaries and terrorists alike. It has also been 
adopted by businesses to help them thrive in a volatile and highly competitive economy. 
What Is an OODA Loop? 
The OODA Loop is a mental model. According to Boyd, decision-making occurs in a 
recurring cycle of observe-orient-decide-act. An entity (whether an individual or an organization) 
that can process this cycle quickly, observing and reacting to unfolding events more rapidly than 
an opponent can thereby “get inside” the opponent’s decision cycle and gain the advantage 
(“OODA Loop,” 2018). A simple version of the OODA Loop is depicted in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12. Simplified OODA Loop 
First, we observe the outside world and the result of our previous actions. Next, we take 
time to orient—analyzing and synthesizing everything we learned in the observation phases. 
Third, the orientation guides our decisions and actions. And finally, the result of those actions 
becomes more information that begins the next cycle of observation. Those who are familiar 
with the scientific method: Observation - Hypothesis - Testing will immediately see the similarity. 
But Boyd added Orientation and strongly emphasized that Orientation was the most important 
step in the OODA Loop. Furthermore, the key aspect of Orientation is to develop alternative 
courses of action. 
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Boyd synthesized this simple idea from his experience as a fighter pilot, and then 
extended it to a more complex final version, shown in Figure 13, in his presentation “The 
Essence of Winning and Losing” (Boyd, 1996; Boyd, Richards, Spinney, & Richards, 2010). 
 
Figure 13. Boyd's OODA Loop—Final Version 
In this version, the observation stage involves a broad range of inputs: unfolding 
circumstances, outside information, one’s unfolding interaction with the environment, and 
feedback from the other three stages. The orientation phase is the focus of the diagram and is 
(intentionally) larger than the other three steps combined. It involves analyzing your cultural 
traditions, genetic heritage, new information, and previous experiences and then synthesizing 
the elements into a new orientation. The major enhancements in the final version are with the 
Orient phase, in keeping with Boyd’s view that it was the most important element, the focal point 
of the loop (Richards, 2004). It is this more complex depiction that will be used to develop the 
proposed technology insertion OODA Loop for future surface warship acquisition. 
With the great potential benefit in using the OODA Loop model, there are also some 
aspects to watch out for. These include the misinterpretation of speed versus tempo and the 
decision paralysis that can come with applying it in large organizations or for complex product 
development. 
Caution 1: Speed vs. Tempo Variation  
The commonly used phrase “get inside your adversary's OODA loop” is sometimes 
interpreted as moving feverishly, going through the cycles O > O > D > A > O > O > D > A faster 
than your adversary. This can create the idea that you always need to be moving at incredible 
(perhaps unrealistic) speed. What Boyd meant to imply was not frenetic movement. He meant 
varying your tempo. Boyd called this variation in tempo a “fast transient.” The transient is the 
change between maneuvers. The ideal fast transient is an abrupt, unexpected, disorienting 
change. Boyd stated in his slide presentation New Conception for Air-to-Air Combat (Boyd, 
1976): 
• Idea of Fast Transients suggests that—in order to win or gain superiority—we should 
operate at a faster tempo than our adversaries time scales. 
• Why? Such activity will make us appear ambiguous (non-predictable) thereby generate 
confusion and disorder among our adversaries… 
He went on further to state: 
Action: Exploit operational and technical features to: 
• Generate a rapidly changing environment (Quick/Clear Observations, Fast Tempo, 
Fast Transients, Quick Kill). 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 20 - 
• Inhibit an adversaries [sic] capacity to adapt to such an environment (suppress or 
distort observations). 
Goal: Unstructure adversaries [sic] system into “Hodge Podge” of confusion and disorder 
by causing him to over and under react because of activity that appears uncertain, 
ambiguous or chaotic.11 
And he summarized with the pithy statement: “He who can handle the quickest rate of change 
survives.” 
Caution 2: Large Organization Paralysis 
In his paper “OO-OO-OO!” The Sound of the Broken OODA Loop, Dr. David Ullman 
(Ullman, 2007) describes a significant problem with the application of the OODA Loop model to 
large organizations. Especially in business and product development, where teams are working 
the OODA Loop, it often gets stuck at the “D”: 
Since the OODA loop was designed to describe a single decision maker, 
the situation is usually much worse than shown as most business and 
technical decisions have a team of people observing and orienting, each 
bringing their own cultural traditions, genetics, experience, and other 
information. It is no wonder that we often get stuck here, and the OODA 
loop is reduced to the stuttering sound of OO-OO-OO. 
Making a single decision, and then repeatedly cycling through deciding what to do next, 
is essential. In contrast to the traditional warship acquisition framework, which emphasizes 
control and cost minimization for fixed requirements leading to a “single loop” process, the 
cyclical OODA Loop approach inherently focuses on learning and refinement in stride. With an 
emphasis on a faster pace, action must be taken without perfect knowledge and it is recognized 
that there is an increased chance that the wrong choice might initially be made. Risk aversion 
inherent to a bureaucracy can stymie the process. But the cyclical nature of the OODA Loop 
fosters learning and with multiple iterations, analysis and decision making are refined with more 
observations of results and outside information, including the adversary’s responses to actions 
taken. This leads to fruitful results. Ullman also provides an expanded OODA Loop for 
consideration, and an extensive list of guidelines for “unsticking the OODA Loop” that should be 
taken into consideration by all those involved in the complex undertaking of surface warship 
acquisition in order to avoid large organization paralysis. 
Technology Insertion OODA Loop Process 
Finally, a tailored process is needed that ties these elements together. The proposal is 
inspired by the work of Boyd and supports the ability to be agilely executed at the right tempo. In 
current parlance, this might be called “the speed of relevance.” As former Secretary of Defense 
James Mattis stated in his remarks on the National Defense Strategy (Mattis, 2018): 
To keep pace with our times, the department will transition to a culture of 
performance and affordability that operates at the speed of relevance. 
Success does not go to the country that develops a new technology first, 
but rather, to the one that better integrates it and more swiftly adapts its 
way of fighting. 
 
11 The underlined words, word spellings and word usage in these two text selections may appear odd but are exactly as Boyd 
originally wrote it on slides 19 and 22 of his New Conception for Air-To-Air Combat briefing. 
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The proposed process is depicted in Figure 14, incorporating tailored inputs and 
adapting the standard OODA Loop model to include current and proposed constituents of the 
surface warship acquisition enterprise.  
 
Figure 14. Technology Insertion OODA Loop 
Tailored inputs to the Observe stage include: 
• Fleet Input (via TANG / Athena) 
• Operational Requirements 
• Technical Requirements 
• Specifications and Standards 
• Acquisition Lessons Learned 
• Logistics Strategy 
• Previous Deficiencies 
• Threat/Intelligence 
• Test and Evaluation strategies and results 
• Operational and Technical Models 
• Financials (including budget, execution, color of money aspects, and investment estimates) 
• Economy (global and national considerations) 
• Technology Solutions from industry, academia and government, including: 
o Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) 
o Military Off The Shelf (MOTS) 
o Research and Development activities 
o Science and Technology activities 
The Orient stage is modified from the elements described by Boyd to those aligned with the 
Navy ship acquisition domain and discussed earlier: 
• Tactical Requirements Group (TRG) 
• Technology Insertion Group (TIG) 
• Digital Twin 
• Program Management (PM) 
• Systems Engineering (SE) 
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The Decide stage is informed by System Evolution Roadmaps, Technology Roadmaps 
and Acquisition Strategies from the Orientation stage, then feeds forward Experimentation Plans 
for prototypes or Developmental Test Plans with mature/maturing systems to be executed in the 
Act stage. The Act stage is where experimentation or various developmental tests, verifications 
and evaluation of products, product elements, or manufacturing or support processes is 
conducted (Defense Acquisition University (DAU), 2018). These are done throughout the 
acquisition process to assist in engineering design and development and to verify that technical 




• Concept of Operations Exercises (COOPEX) 
• Land Based Test Facilities (LBTF) 
• Self Defense Test Ship (SDTS)12 
• SURFDEVRON 
The creation of modular open system payload stations and installation of other Flexible-
Adaptable-Modular ship features would be especially valuable on the Navy’s SDTS at NSWC 
Port Hueneme and on SURFDEVRON vessels. This would permit a beneficial stepwise 
maturation and accompanying examination of capabilities, bridging the gap between the land-
based environment and demonstration/experimentation that could be conducted at-sea with 
sailors from the SURFDEVRON. 
Conclusion 
In summary, there is much work to be done to put the proposed process in place, but 
there is also great promise in what it can deliver to improve outcomes. NAVSEA and the 
affiliated PEOs are positioned to solidify the key enablers and put a strategy in place. The result 
can neutralize our adversaries, and perhaps avoid costly direct conflict, in harmony with the 
principles of Sun Tzu. As stated by Boyd in his work The Strategic Game of “? and ?” 
(Hammond, 2018): 
Mentally we can isolate our adversaries by presenting them with 
ambiguous, deceptive, or novel situations, as well as by operating at a 
tempo or rhythm they can neither make out nor keep up with. Operating 
inside their OODA loops will accomplish just this by disorienting or twisting 
their mental images so that they can neither appreciate nor cope with 
what’s really going on. 
In partnership with the fleet and OPNAV staff, the surface warship acquisition community 
can overcome rigid industrial-age processes by bringing these enablers to bear and adopting an 
OODA Loop framework for technology insertion in its future flexible surface warship acquisition 
and sustainment process. This would present a formidable challenge to our adversaries and 
help achieve our goal of naval superiority. 
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